Casual observation suggests that Internet media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from a free advertisement-based product. In this paper I characterize when this business model is optimal and analyze its impact on advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus. The optimality of the business model depends on the relation between product quality, the annoyance of advertisements and on advertisers' profit margins from selling goods to consumers. I show that when consumers can pay to remove advertisements, advertisement quantity increases and the firm and the advertisers gain at the expense of consumers. Further, advertising quantity and firm profits may be increasing in the annoyance of advertisements. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
Introduction
There are many recent examples of cases where firms allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an otherwise ad-based product. For example, Slashdot.org allows users to pay $5 for 1000 ad-free pages. Gamespot.com offer a monthly subscription for $3.33 that (among some other benefits) removes advertisements 1 . The Walt Disney Company offers TV series for purchase through the iTunes store for $1,99 per episode. A free alternative with advertisements is available on their homepage or through watching the show on TV. 2 We7 offers music downloads with 10 second ads attached for free or for a fee without ads. 3 There are also companies such as Ultramercial that allow consumers to " pay" for premium content on websites by watching a series of interactive advertisements. 4 These examples highlight a strategy where media providers and software companies practice second-degree price discrimination by offering two versions differing in advertising quantity. The strategy is easy to follow for online media firms, since advertisements are easily separable from content.
Technologies such as streaming video over the Internet are also making it easier to charge consumers for an ad-free version of television shows.
The increasing use of this practice raises questions about its impact on advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus among the agents involved. The provision of programming and advertising in the broadcasting industry has been subject to a considerable degree of attention from regulators. For example, advertising quantity is regulated in several European countries. As an increasing amount of advertising expenditures move online, the implications of newly available strategies such as charging consumers for the removal of advertisements may become important in policy discussions. 5 1 Slashdot.org (2007) and Gamespot.com (2007) 2 Bossman (2006) . Some cable television companies also offer subscription services for digital video recorders, that can be set to automatically remove advertisements from recorded shows.
3 We7.com (2007) 4 Ultramercial.com (2007) . Ultramercial offers a gallery of over 400 reviews of previous successful campaigns (one example is the online version of The Economist, which sometimes can be fully accessed if the visitor clicks through a sequence of ads or watches a short video).
5 According to ZenithOptimedia, the total amount spent globally on Internet advertising will exceed advertising expenditures on radio in 2008. Further, the rate of spending is predicted to increase six times faster than spending on traditional media between 2006 and 2009 (Ilett, 2007) .
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The goal of this paper is two-fold. I first seek to understand when allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal for a monopolist media firm. I then seek to analyze how advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus is affected by shifting from a business model of being entirely ad-based to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements. To this end, I construct a model of a two-sided vertically differentiated market. A monopolist media firm may mediate advertisements between advertisers and consumers by attaching them to an already developed product of given quality. Consumers are heterogeneous over their valuation for quality and they perceive advertisements as reducing the quality of the product. Advertisers are monopoly producers of new goods and they are heterogeneous over the purchase probability of their goods. The media firm has three possible business models that can be implemented. The media firm can be purely fee-based, purely ad-based or have an ad-based version but allow consumers to pay to remove the ads. I show the following. A business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of the media firm's product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high, and advertisers' profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may benefit from an increase in the annoyance of advertisements. Advertising quantity is higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when they can't and advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of advertisements (this offers a testable implication of the model). Shifting to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
Essentially, the idea is that the media firm must balance revenues from consumers and revenues from advertisers. Revenues from advertisers are tied to advertisers' profit margins and the number of consumers viewing ads. Hence, when consumers are highly profitable to advertisers the media firm is better of not allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements as it would decrease the number of consumers that view ads. Conversely if the quality of the media firm's product were relatively high, introducing a free ad-based product would only cannibalize sales from the fee-based alternative. Being purely fee-based is optimal in this case. For cases where advertisers' profit margins and the quality of the media firm's product is low in relation to the annoyance of ads it may be that the cannibalization effect is sufficiently low. Then, having a free ad-based version and allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal.
In this case, profits are increasing in the annoyance of ads since the cannibalization effect from the free version is reduced and higher prices can be charged for the removal of ads. Further, advertising quantity is higher than under a purely ad-based business model. This is since a higher price can be charged for removing advertisements if the ad-based version has more ads. Advertising quantity is also increasing in the annoyance of ads, since the marginal impact of an increase in advertising quantity on utility is higher when the annoyance advertising is higher. Consumer welfare is reduced compared to offering only an ad-based version even though consumers have more options. Consumers using the ad-based version view more ads. Consumers paying to remove them pay a higher price than the disutility ads would have cost them had the media firm been purely ad-based.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 describes the setup of the model. I solve for optimal prices under 3 different business models (fee-based, ad-based and paying to remove advertisements) and compare under what condition each business model is optimal in section 4. Section 5 compares the change in advertising quantity and in the distribution of surplus when the media firm moves from being purely ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements.
The final section concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on price discrimination in media markets. Previous analyses in the media market literature have focused on welfare issues related to pay-per-view versus free airing of outstanding events (such as boxing matches). Price discrimination is an issue since the media firm can require consumers to pay to watch the event live, and then air it for free a day later. This is the setup in Holden (1993) , who concludes that consumers are harmed by the possibility of pay-per-view. Hansen and Kyhl (2001) consider a slightly different setup in which the pay-per-view version contains advertisements and a free version is not available. They analyze how a ban on pay-per-view affects welfare. They find that consumer welfare 3 is enhanced by a ban, but that the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous.
A recent addition to the literature is by Anderson and Gans (2007) , who examine the impact on broadcaster behavior when consumers adopt advertising avoidance technologies. They show that advertising quantity could increase, as the remaining consumers are less averse to advertising. As a result, overall welfare and program quantity could decrease and programming would be tailored to appeal to a broader range of viewers.
Price discrimination in media markets has also attracted some attention in the marketing literature. Prasad, Mahajan, and Bronnenberg (2003) analyze incentives to price discriminate when consumers are of two given types and a media firm may offer two versions differing in advertising quantity and price. They show that offering two versions (price discrimination) tend to be optimal in most cases.
For the cases I have in mind, the media firms typically provide one free ad-based version and one fee-based version. The versions are similar, so consumers essentially pay to remove the advertisements. The effects on pricing and surplus distribution of offering consumers the opportunity to pay to remove all advertisements have not so far been explored in the literature.
An analysis of this case is important, since the provision of the option to pay to remove advertisements is likely to affect advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus among agents. Holden (1993) does consider this type of setup, but he only examines the impact on consumer surplus. Further, consumers are homogeneous in terms of the impact of advertising on utility in his model. Consumers with heterogeneous aversion to advertising appear in Anderson and Gans (2007) and in Prasad et al. (2003) . Anderson and Gans (2007) do not however consider the simultaneous determination of price for a fee-based version and price for advertising space. They mainly focus on the case where advertising avoidance technologies are acquired from other suppliers than the broadcaster.
In spirit, the analysis of Prasad et al. (2003) is perhaps closest to the analysis in this paper. In their paper advertising affects the perceived quality of the media firm's product negatively. However, Prasad et al. (2003) consider only two types of consumers while I model consumer types as continuously distributed on an interval. This allows for a closer connection between the consumer and the advertiser side of the market. An ad-free version is also not available in Prasad et al. (2003) . Both versions contain The model is quite closely related to models that appear in Katsamankas and Bakos (2004) and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) . However, I consider negative externalities in one direction and incorporate a form of price discrimination towards one side of the market. their goods. The relationship between the media firm, consumers and advertisers are outlined in figure 1. I now describe in detail the media firm, the consumers and the advertisers.
The Media Firm
Consider a monopolist media firm that has developed a good of intrinsic quality level v. 7 The fixed costs related to the development of this product are sunk and duplication carries small or zero costs. The media firm interacts with consumers and advertisers and can choose between three business models.
• Fee-based: The media firm could sell the product at price p c to consumers and not have any ads.
• Ad-based: The media firm could offer the product for free to consumers and sell ad-space to advertisers for the price p a .
• Paying to remove advertisements: The media firm could offer both the product without ads for a price p c and the product with ads for free and sell ad-space for p a .
The media firm chooses the business model that offers the highest profits. The ad-based version is explicitly constrained to carry a zero price.
This specification is important and motivated by the examples in the introduction, where firms are observed to specifically offer consumers otherwise enjoying a free ad-based version the option to pay to remove all advertisements. 8
Consumers
I consider a continuum of consumers of mass N with unit demand. Consumers dislike ads and perceive a good with ads as a good of inferior quality.
For the markets I have in mind, it seems to be reasonable to assume that consumers dislike ads. First, consumers are observed to be willing to pay to remove advertisements so they clearly reveal a preference for consuming the product without ads. Second, there is casual evidence that advertising is not desirable. For example, according to Ehomeupgrade.com (2007) , a report issued by DIGDIA (www.digdia.com) showed that 44% of consumers would prefer to watch a movie on TV without ads and paying $3,99, while only 17% would pay $2,99 and watch the content on TV with ads. The other options where buying a DVD (27%), downloading the movie and watching it on the computer for $3,99 (9%) and watching the movie on the computer with ads for $2,99 (3%). As Ehomeupgrade.com (2007) puts it: "Over 250% more people would rather pay an extra dollar just to avoid ads with their movie". I hence assume that consumers dislike advertisements. 9 Specifically, consumers perceive a good with advertisements to be of quality q = v − γa.
The variable a denotes advertisement quantity and γ measures the impact of advertising on quality. It is interpreted as the general annoyance level of advertisements. I want to focus on the case where quality is positive so I set a to be equal to the share of advertisers that choose to advertise and I
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal valuation of quality denoted by θ. The distribution of θ is uniform on the unit interval.
Hence, a consumer indexed by i gets utility
where p c is the price consumers pay to remove advertisements (or simply the price for the product if the free version is not available). Hence, the "cost" of the media firm's product to consumers is either the price p c or the individual disutility θ i γa incurred due to ads being present. The fraction of consumers adopting the fee-based version of the product is given by m while the fraction adopting the free ad-based version is given by n.
The specific dependence of quality on advertising used here allows consumers to be heterogeneous both in terms of intrinsic product quality and over the impact of advertising on their utility. 10 This is consistent with the interpretation that advertisements degrade the perceived quality of the product. It seems reasonable to assume that consumers who value quality more also dislike advertisements more. First, in many cases advertising takes up space, which reduces the amount of content. The reduction of content is more important for consumers who value content highly. Second, advertising requires attention from consumers. Consumers who value quality highly might have a higher opportunity cost of time and hence dislike advertisements more.
Advertisers
The advertisers, a mass of 1, are monopoly producers of new goods. 11 Advertising fills the role of informing consumers about prices and characteristics of their goods. 12 Each advertiser has developed a new good characterized by its type σ uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The type of the good indicates its purchase probability after being advertised. Goods of higher type are more likely to be bought after being advertised. I assume that the profit margin on the goods sold by the advertisers is equal to s.
Hence, an advertiser j is willing to pay a maximum price of σ j snN to place an advertisement in the media firm's product. The advertiser j profits from advertising according to
To simplify, I assume that consumers gain no utility from purchasing goods from advertisers. Hence, all informational benefits from advertising are captured by the advertisers. A possible extension would be to consider the case where the profit margins of the advertisers are dependent on con-10 A heterogeneous impact of advertising on utility is an important difference between my model and the analyses in Holden (1993) and Hansen and Kyhl (2001) . Heterogeneous aversion to advertising is a part of the analysis in Prasad et al. (2003) , but they do not consider to what extent advertisements impact utility. Essentially the assumption is that γ = 1. They also consider only two consumer types (θH and θL).
11 So N > 1 implies that there are relatively more consumers than advertisers. 12 Note that I refer to the good sold and produced by the media firm as the product. The goods advertisers produce and sell are referred to as goods. For a discussion of the different roles of advertising see for example Bagwell (2005) .
sumers' valuation of quality, θ. Relaxing this assumption would imply at least two things.
First, a formal model of how advertisers price their goods would be needed. Their pricing decision would be dependent on how many consumers use the ad-based version the media firm offers and hence on the price for removing advertisements. 13 Second, consumers would be left with some surplus from purchasing advertisers' goods and hence have to balance the disutility from having advertisements with possible gains from being informed about a useful product that generates utility. These are important aspects to account for, but unfortunately they are not a straightforward extension of this model and are left for future research.
To summarize, I construct a model of a two-sided vertically differentiated market in which a media firm may mediate advertisements between advertisers and consumers. Consumers are heterogeneous over their valuation for quality and they perceive advertisements as reducing the quality of the product. Advertisers are monopoly producers of new goods and they are heterogeneous over the purchase probability of their goods. The media firm has three possible business models that can be implemented. Either the media firm is purely fee-based, purely ad-based or the firm allows consumers to pay to remove advertisements.
Solving the Model
Having described the setup of the model, I now solve for optimal prices under the three different business models the media firm can adopt. I then compare profit levels to check when each business model is optimal. Solving the model shows that a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of the media firm's product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high, and
advertisers' profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may have an incentive to increase the annoyance of advertisements.
Fee-based
Consider the business model where the media firm is entirely fee-based and offers no ad-based product. Let the consumer indifferent between buying the fee-based product and not buying be of type θ c . Then consumers of type θ ∈ [θ c , 1] buy the product. The location of θ c is given by
Demand for the fee-based product is N m
The media firm chooses price to maximize profits.
Proposition 1: When the media firm is fee-based, the price for the product
Proof. See the appendix. When the media firm is fee-based, a higher quality product implies higher
profits. An increase in the number of consumers has the same effect. Optimal prices and profits do not depend on characteristics on the advertiser side of the market.
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to quality. Hence, one might ask whether the media firm would find it optimal to price discriminate by offering two versions of the good, v H and v L , such that v H > v L . It can be shown that this kind of price discrimination is not optimal. The reason is that marginal costs are zero and are not affected by the quality level. Hence, there is no reduction in marginal costs when quality is reduced. It is then optimal to offer only one version (with the current utility specification). 14
Ad-based
I now consider the business model where the firm is entirely ad-based. Consumers can not pay to remove advertisements. Let the advertiser indifferent between advertising and not advertising own the good of type σ a . Then 14 See for example Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) advertisers with goods of type σ ∈ [σ a , 1] will advertise. Total advertising quantity is a = (1 − σ a ). The location of σ a will be given by
Notice that all consumers watch the ads (n = 1). This is since the media firm's product is free when the media firm is entirely ad-based and quality is always non-negative (v − γa ≥ 0). Demand for ad-space can then be expressed as a(p a ) = (1 − pa sN ) for p a ∈ [0, N s], a(p a ) = 0 for p a > N s and by a(p a ) = 1 otherwise. The media firm's profit function is given by
The firm chooses price for ad-space so as to maximize profits.
Proposition 2: When the media firm is ad-based, optimal price for adspace is sN 2 and profits are Π A = sN 4 . Advertising quantity is 1 2 .
Proof. See the appendix. When the firm is ad-based, all consumers use the product and view the ads. The media firm can charge more for ad-space if advertisers' profit margins (s) are higher or if there are more consumers (N ) in the market viewing the advertisements. Notice that the level of annoyance of advertisements (γ) is of no importance to the media firm since profits are not earned from consumers and the annoyance is assumed to be low enough so that no consumers stop using the media firm's product.
Paying to Remove Advertisements
In this subsection I consider paying to remove advertisements. Both the feebased and the ad-based version are hence available. Consumers not choosing the ad-based version adopt the fee-based version (pay to remove ads). I first characterize demand formation and then solve for optimal prices, profits and advertising quantity. I consider only interior solutions where demand for the fee-based product and demand for ad-space is positive. 
Demand Formation
Consumers. Let θ c denote the consumer indifferent between paying to remove advertisements and using the ad-based version for free. Given prices, it must then be that consumers with θ ∈ [θ c , 1] pay while consumers with θ ∈ [0, θ c ] use the free version. Using equation (1), the location of the indifferent consumer can be obtained from the indifference equation
for θ c . This gives θ c = pc γa . Demand for the ad-based version is then given by N n(p c , a) = N ( pc γa ) for p c ∈ [0, γa], by N for p c > γa and by 0 otherwise. Demand for the fee-based version is N m(p c , a) = N [1 − n(p c , a)]. All consumers acquire the media firm's product, but only the fraction n view the ads.
Advertisers. Let the advertiser indifferent between advertising and not advertising own the good of type σ a . Advertisers with goods of type σ ∈ [σ a , 1] advertise and the location of σ a is given by the indifference equation
Demand for ad-space is then a(p a , n) = (1 − pa snN ) for p a ∈ [0, snN ], 0 for p a > snN and 1 otherwise. Demand is illustrated in figure 2.
To account for the fact that demand for ad-space depends on demand for the ad-based version and vice versa, I assume that consumers form rational expectations regarding the participation of advertisers and that advertisers form rational expectations regarding the participation of users (see Katz and Shapiro (1985) ). 15 Rational expectations on behalf of the advertisers and the consumers require that the following system of equations be solved in order to obtain demand as functions of price on both sides of the market:
This system has the solutions n(p c , p a ) = pa sN + pc γ and a(p c , p a ) = sN pc sN pc+paγ . They give the share of consumers viewing the advertisements and demand for ad-space as functions of the price to remove advertisements and the price for ad-space. Demand for the ad-based version is N n(p c , p a ) and demand for the fee-based version is N [m(p c , p a )].
Pricing
The media firm sets price for the fee-based version and price for ad-space to Proposition 3: When the media firm offers both an ad-based and a feebased version of its product, optimal advertising quantity is 1 3 + γ 3s , price for ad-space is p a = N 1 9 (s + 2s γ − γ), price for the fee-based version is p c = (s+γ) 2 9s and profits are Π F +A = N (s+γ) 2 (2γ−s) 27sγ . Profits from consumers are increasing in γ and decreasing in s. Profits from advertisers are decreasing in γ and increasing in s.
Proof. See the appendix.
The proposition shows that the price for removing advertisements, the price for ad-space and total profits of the media firm depend on characteristics on both sides of the market. The optimal source of revenues for the media firm depends on the relation between γ and s, since this determines the ability to extract revenue from consumers relative to the ability to extract revenue from advertisers. By setting price for removing advertisements and price for ad-space the media firm can determine what share of consumers view ads and what share pays to remove them. A higher annoyance of ads implies that more can be charged for removing them, hence consumers become a more important source of revenues relative to advertisers. If the profit margins of advertisers increase this implies that they are willing to pay more for reaching each consumer. Consumers then become relatively more important as viewers of ads compared to being paying consumers, and hence revenues from advertisers increase in relative importance.
Overall profits are increasing in both γ and s. That overall profits increase in s is perhaps intuitive, since there is "more surplus to be shared".
However, that overall profits increase in γ is perhaps less intuitive. They increase in γ because if advertisements are more annoying this implies that price for removing advertisements can be increased. At optimum, the profit gains from consumers outweigh the losses in profits from advertisers (due to less consumers viewing advertisements).
The fact that the profit is increasing in γ implies that the media firm would have incentives to increase the general level of annoyance of ads. As will be shown below, a higher γ (when allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal) increases advertiser surplus. This is because optimal ad-price is decreasing in γ. Hence, advertisers may not object to actions by the media firm that make advertisements more annoying. They may even contribute in the design of their advertisements.
A final point to note is the following. Providing two versions differing in quality (fee-based and ad-based) is essentially second-degree price discrimination. As was discussed above, price discrimination by simply providing two versions differing in their inherent quality is not optimal in this model since there are no savings in terms of marginal costs from providing a lower quality version. However, price discrimination by degrading quality with advertisements may be optimal. This is because profits from selling adver-14 tising space acts as a negative marginal cost. A lower quality version allows more ad-space to be sold. Compared to providing only a fee-based version, profits from consumers actually decrease when two versions differing in perceived quality are offered. The profit loss is however compensated by gains from selling ad-space. 16
Comparing Business Models
By comparisons of profit levels from propositions 1, 2 and 3 the following proposition can be obtained.
Proposition 4: For s γ ∈ [0, 1 2 ], only a fee-based version is optimal. For s γ ∈] 1 2 , 2[ and v < v * a fee-based version and an ad-based version should be made available so consumers can pay to remove advertisements. If Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition behind proposition 4 is the following. When ad-space is sold, the media firm has two possible sources of revenues. It can either charge consumers for a fee-based version, or charge advertisers for access to consumers. Consumers' willingness to pay for a fee-based version is related to the annoyance of advertisements (γ). Advertisers willingness to pay for ad-space is related to their profit level(s). Hence, the relation between the two variables determine on what source of revenues the media firm should focus. However, it may be that simply selling the product to consumers and not involving advertisers is optimal. This is the case if product quality (v) is sufficiently high so that offering a free ad-based version is suboptimal due to concerns about cannibalization of sales of the fee-based version.
To summarize, solving the model showed that allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal if the ratio s γ is in an intermediate range and v is sufficiently low. This implies that a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of the media firm's product is low, the impact of advertising on quality is high, and advertisers' profit margins are low.
Advertising Quantity and Surplus Distribution
Having outlined optimal prices under the different business models and compared them I now move over to analyze the implications on advertising quantity and the surplus distribution of a shift from being ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements. I first analyze the difference in advertising quantity, then consider the difference in the surplus distribution. I show that advertising quantity is higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when they can't. This yields a testable implication of my model. Further, advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of advertisements. Shifting to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
Advertising Quantity
Proposition 5: Suppose allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is optimal. Then advertising quantity (i) is increasing in the annoyance of ads.
(ii) is higher than when the media firm is purely ad-based.
Proof. Follows by straightforward comparison of advertising quantity in proposition 2 and 3 and by inspection of advertising quantity in proposition 3.
The first result of proposition 5 may be surprising. Intuitively, one might think that if advertisements generate more disutility through their impact on quality, advertising quantity should be decreased. However, a higher impact on utility is desirable for the media firm since this decreases the value of the ad-based version. Further, it increases the marginal impact of advertising quantity on quality. This implies that optimal advertising quantity should be increased by decreasing price for ad-space. Hence, as γ increases advertising quantity increases.
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The second result that advertising quantity is higher under paying to remove advertisements compared to the business model where the media firm is ad-based is due to the fact that the media firm has incentives to make paying to remove advertisements as attractive as possible to consumers. This can be done by lowering price for removing advertisements or by decreasing price for advertising space (thereby increasing advertisement quantity). At optimum, doing both is optimal so advertising quantity increases as price for ad-space falls.
This result yields a testable implication of the model. When firms allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements, advertisement quantity should be higher than when the option is not available (or the existing ads should be more annoying). There seems to be some anecdotal evidence of this result. When traffic to slashdot.org increased, the option to pay to get rid of advertisements was introduced (Slashdot.org, 2007) . As Prasad et al. (2003) mentions, Slashdot.org increased the number of advertisements displayed in connection with introducing the option. The same seems to be true for Gamespot.com . Compared to other sites that CNET Networks operate, Gamespot.com seems to have the most advertisements. It is one of two sites in their portfolio that allow consumers to pay to get rid of the advertisements (Gamespot.com, 2007) .
The Distribution of Surplus
In this subsection I compare the change in the distribution of surplus among advertisers, the media firm and consumers. Specifically, I am interested in considering the implications on the surplus distribution of a shift from being ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements. As emphasized in the introduction, newly available technologies are making it easier for traditionally ad-based firms to charge consumers for a fee-based version of their product. There also seems to have been an increase in the practice of offering software services in ad-based versions (usually to consumers) and in paid versions (usually to corporations). This may party be due to the increasing presence of Internet based software. By comparing the distribution of surplus across the different ranges in my model I am able to analyze how these new technologies may impact consumer, advertiser and producer surplus.
Given optimal prices, consumer surplus can be split into the surplus to consumers consuming the fee-based version and to consumers consuming the ad-based version:
while surplus left to advertisers can be denoted
Total surplus is defined as T S = CS F + CS A + AS + Π. In order to focus on the shift to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements I assume that v is sufficiently low so that shifting to a fully fee-based business model is not optimal. By substituting optimal parameter values from propositions 2 and 3 and comparing surpluses, the following proposition can be shown.
Proposition 6: A shift from being ad-based to allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements results in higher profits for the media firm, greater surplus to advertisers and a decrease in consumer surplus. The impact on total surplus is ambiguous.
Proof. See the appendix. Consider the change in surplus distribution when paying to remove advertisements is introduced. The media firm obviously benefits, otherwise it could remain purely ad-based. Perhaps surprisingly, consumers are worse off when they have the option to pay to remove advertisements. Consumers who choose to pay to remove advertisements are worse off because the price they are forced to pay causes more disutility than advertising did when the firm was ad-based. They are still willing to pay though, since when the option to pay to remove advertisements is available advertising quantity in the ad-based version is increased. Since ad-quantity is increased, consumers using the free version when both options are available are also worse off.
These consumers now have to put up with a higher amount of advertisements than under the purely ad-based business model. Finally, a higher amount of advertising implies that price for ad-space must decrease causing advertisers to benefit. To summarize, this section showed that advertising quantity is higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when they can't. Further, advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of advertisements. Shifting to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
Conclusion
In this paper I have showed that a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements is more likely to be optimal when the quality of the media firm's product is low, the annoyance of advertisements is high, and advertisers' profit margins are low. Further, the media firm may benefit from an increase in the annoyance of advertisements. Advertising quantity is higher when consumers can pay to remove advertisements compared to when they can't and advertising quantity may be increasing in the annoyance of advertisements (this offers a testable implication of the model). Shifting to a business model of allowing consumers to pay to remove advertisements harms consumers but benefits advertisers and the media firm. The impact on total welfare is ambiguous.
Understanding what impact price discrimination may have on advertising quantity and the distribution of surplus may be of importance in discussions related to policy issues. An increasing percentage of advertising budgets are spent on advertising online and new technologies that permit consumers to pay to remove advertisements are emerging. Hence, the results of this analysis may be of interest to policy makers.
In terms of further research, generalizing the model by introducing competition among media firms is an obvious next step. 18 Further possible extensions would be to incorporate advertisers that care about which type of consumers they reach and/or to allow consumers to receive informational benefits from viewing advertisements. Finally, a testable implication of the model is that advertising quantity should be higher when the option of paying to remove advertisements is available to consumers. Empirically testing this implication might be interesting.
the media firm can achieve at this boundary occurs when γ = v. In this case Π F = Π A+F in which case I assume that the media firm prefers to be purely fee-based. For any γ < v it must be that a business model of being entirely fee-based is optimal at the boundary.
Profits can be split into profits from consumers and profits from advertisers. Profits from consumers are given by Π C A+F = N (2γ−s)(γ+s) 2 27γs and profits from advertisers are given by Π A A+F = N (2s−γ)(γ+s) 2
27γs
. It is then the case that 
Proof of proposition 4
By the proof to proposition 3, Π F ≥ Π A+F > Π A if s γ ≤ 1 2 since γ ≤ v. This gives the first part of the proposition. If s γ ∈] 1 2 , 2[ then Π A+F > Π A by proof to proposition 3 but it may be that Π F ≥ Π A+F . This is the case for v ≥ v * where v * is such that Π F − Π A+F = N v * 4 − N (γ+s) 2 27γs = 0. This gives the second part. If s γ ≥ 2 then Π A > Π A+F by the proof to proposition 3 but it may be that Π F ≥ Π A . This is the case for v ≥ v * * where v * * is such that Π F − Π A = N v * * 4 − N s 4 = 0.
Proof of proposition 6
Paying to remove advertisements: Consumer and advertiser surplus if the media firm allows consumers to pay to remove advertisements is given by: where θ * c = s+γ 3γ , σ * = 2s−γ 3s , a * = 1 3 + γ 3s , p * c = (s+γ) 9s and p * a = N 1 9 (s+ 2s γ −γ). The surplus to these consumers under the ad-based business model, i.e. with θ * c = s+γ 3γ , σ * = 2s−γ 3s , a * = 1 2 and p * a = N s 2 , would have been:
where the sum of these two is N (2v−γ) 4 and total advertiser surplus under the ad-based business model is AS A = N s 8 . Consider the following differences in surplus. Let ∆CS F = CS F F +A − CS F A ′ denote the difference in surplus to consumers who choose to pay to remove advertisements when this option is available to them. Let ∆CS A = CS A F +A − CS A A ′ be the difference in surplus for consumers who still choose to use the advertising based version when the option to pay to remove advertisements is available. Denote by ∆AS = AS F +A − AS A the difference in advertiser surplus and by ∆Π = Π F +A − Π A the difference in firm profits.
Let r be the ratio s γ . Then the differences in surplus can be expressed as
∆CS A = (r − 2)(1 + r) 2 N γ 108r (21) ∆AS = (r − 2) 2 (1 + 4r)N γ 216r (22) ∆Π = (r − 2) 2 (1 + 4r)N γ 108r (23) The difference in advertiser surplus and firm profits is positive for r ∈] 1 2 , 2[. The difference in consumer surplus is negative for both consumer segments.
The effect on total welfare is equal to ∆W = ∆AS +∆CS F +∆CS A +∆Π = 1 216r M γ(r − 2)(4 + r(16r − 25)). The effect on total welfare is ambiguous and depends on sign{4 + r(16r − 25)}.
